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Abstract
Researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions in isolation within simple
neoclassical models to open up a role for institutions, inject realism into their models
and examine the impact of these distortions on output and employment. We present an
overlapping generations model with production in which a labor market friction (moral
hazard) coexists with a credit market friction (costly state veriﬁcation). The simultaneous
presence and interaction of these two frictionsi ss t u d i e d .O u rm a i nr e s u l t sa r e :( i )w h i l e
credit market frictions aﬀect real activity and employment both in the short and long run,
labor market frictions typically have only short-run eﬀects unless they also aﬀect the volume
of investment per worker, (ii) the two frictions amplify each other to produce higher long-
run unemployment than would result from only labor market frictions, (iii) these distortions
have the ability to prolong the eﬀect of temporary shocks, and (iv) the dynamical properties
of economies with both frictions are, somewhat surprisingly, qualitatively similar to their
frictionless counterparts.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies multiple information frictions in a neoclassical growth model with the objec-
tive of understanding how credit and labor market frictions interact to contribute to persistent
involuntary unemployment and relative income gaps across nations. To that end, an overlapping
generations economy with production is analyzed in which a labor market friction (moral haz-
ard) coexists with a credit market friction (costly state veriﬁcation). The simultaneous presence
and interaction of these two frictions is studied. An increase in the severity of credit market
distortions is shown to increase long-run unemployment, while a worsening of the labor market
friction results in lower income per capita than would obtain otherwise.
Researchers have incorporated labor and credit market imperfections within simple neoclas-
sical models principally to facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world thereby
opening up a role for institutions and injecting a healthy dose of realism into their models. For
instance, the importance of credit frictions in the analysis of growth, development and business
cycles has been highlighted by a number of papers including Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Tsid-
don (1992), Bencivenga and Smith (1993), Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Williamson (1987b), Azariadis and Chakraborty (1998), and Khan (2001). Concurrently
another branch of the literature, Smith (1989, 1995), Bencivenga and Smith (1997), Jullien and
Picard (1998) for example, has studied the eﬀect of labor market frictions on aggregate outcomes.
Almost the entire existing literature, however, treats these frictions in isolation. Yet there is good
reason to believe that credit and labor markets are tightly interlinked and that eﬀects in one
market often spill over into the other, either dampening or amplifying them. A major focus
of this paper is to demonstrate that the “value added” to a joint analysis of these frictions is
substantial.
The empirical relevance of these aforementioned frictions, not just for poor countries but
also for the richer ones, is well-documented. For instance, Jappelli (1990) provides systematic
evidence of widespread credit rationing in a country as ﬁnancially evolved as the US. Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) and Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) note that the probability of self-
employment in the US and UK depends positively upon whether the individual ever received
an inheritance, compelling evidence of the imperfectness of capital markets. About a ﬁfth of
respondents in a 1987 UK survey on the self-employed rated where to get ﬁnance as their biggest
diﬃculty (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998). In recent years, tight credit market conditions in
2Japan have been partially blamed for the lack of employment growth there.1 In a recent paper,
Banerjee, Duﬂo, and Munshi (2002) ﬁnd that “the gap between the marginal product of capital
and the market interest rate [in India] seems to be at least 70 percentage points, and the gap
between the marginal product of capital and the rate paid to savers is even larger.” Rajan and
Zingales (1998) use industry-level data to show how greater credit frictions in Europe, compared
to the US, have subdued growth in industries more dependent on external ﬁnance. Similarly
labor market frictions have received ample attention from researchers analyzing the marked rise
of European unemployment during the past three decades (see Rogerson, 2000, for comprehensive
and up-to-date evidence).
T h e r ei sp e r s u a s i v ee v i d e n c et h a tc r e d i tm a r k e tc o n d i t i o n sh a v es t r o n ge ﬀects on employ-
ment.2 Nearly 40% of jobs in the US, for example, are held in small ﬁrms (with less than 100
employees) while 58.1% of private sector workers work in ﬁrms with less than 500 employees
(BLS, 2000). Small businesses are also the primary source of new jobs in the US economy. As
Berkowtiz and White (2002) note, “from 1990 to 1995, businesses with fewer than 500 employees
accounted for 76.5 percent of net new jobs. But small businesses have a very high turnover rate
compared to large businesses. Over 13 percent of U.S. jobs in 1995 were in ﬁrms that did not
exist before 1990 and over 12 percent of jobs in 1990 were in ﬁrms that had ceased to exist by
1995”. These small ﬁr m s ,t h eo n e sm o s tl i k e l yt of a c et h eg r e a t e s td i ﬃculties in raising ﬁnance,
therefore contribute signiﬁcantly to job creation and destruction. Similarly, in the case of Europe,
Acemoglu (2000) notes how the fraction of employment in the most credit-dependent industries
has been lower there than in the US.3
Our analysis bridges the gap between the credit and labor friction literatures. On the credit
side, we adopt Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig’s (1985) costly state veriﬁcation approach
1The IMF in its 1999 report on Japan noted: “The drop of business investment over the past two years has been
particularly severe. ...reduced expectations of long-term growth encouraged ﬁrms to cut-back plans for capital
accumulation. Limits on the availability of bank credit also seem to have been a negative factor...expectations of
future earnings have been undermined by a rising unemployment rate and by prospects for further increases in
the period ahead as a number of major corporations have announced employment reduction plans.”
2The simple correlation between the unemployment rate in 20 OECD countries and the net interest margin
(a measure of credit market eﬃciency, it is the the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a share
of its total assets) in those countries is about 0.37. The unemployment data are standardized averages from
1991-97 from the OECD, and the net interest margin data are time-averaged over the same period from the Beck,
Demirgkuc-Kunt and Levine (1999) dataset. Note that net interest data likely understate true costs of credit
because they are computed ex post, net of losses on non-performing loans.
3Economic historians too have touched upon similar issues. Williamson (1984) notes that during the British
Industrial Revolution, certain industries like construction contributed heavily to GDP (and employment) and
yet were severely credit constrained by the high interest rates at the time. Hamilton (1999) argues that white
landowners in the South around the time of the Civil War were often so credit strapped that they could not
pay their black slaves any cash wages, and this aﬀected the employment situation and well-being of many black
families at the time.
3to provide a clear channel through which borrowing constraints and related distortions aﬀect
investment decisions. On the labor market side, we adapt the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) moral
hazard and eﬃciency wages framework.4 We prefer this over an adverse selection model partly
because the empirical relevance of the eﬃciency wage model is fairly well-documented (Huang
et al, 1998), but also because it facilitates a rich and tractable analysis.
In our model, workers suﬀer disutility costs of working and of exerting eﬀort. Firms receive
a noisy signal about how averse workers are to exerting full eﬀort. Consequently, they hire
only those who have ‘low enough’ disutility costs of working, while others remain involuntarily
unemployed. Incentive compatible wage payments are also tailored to elicit full eﬀort from
employees. The higher is the wage rate, the less incentive do workers have to shirk and hence,
lower is the equilibrium unemployment needed to ‘discipline’ the workers. In such a setting,
credit frictions lower wages by hurting capital accumulation, thereby aggravating unemployment
problems.
Labor frictions, at the same time, resonate in the credit market. Since investment projects
are indivisible and subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are observed by lenders at a cost, agency
costs determine the number of potential entrepreneurs who obtain loans and produce capital.
More severe incentive problems in the labor market lower employment and constrict the pool of
potential capitalists. They may also reduce the supply of loanable funds. Relative to a frictionless
world, less investment is undertaken and capital production per capita is also lower in the long
run. In this context, our analysis suggests that high European unemployment, for example, may
be better understood as the joint outcome of credit and labor market imperfections rather than
the latter in isolation.
We also investigate the short-run dynamic eﬀects of frictions. In general, we ﬁnd that exter-
nal shocks, for instance to the Solow residual, get ampliﬁed when credit and labor markets are
distorted. These frictions may also prolong the eﬀects of such shocks. Credit frictions, in partic-
ular, slow down steady-state convergence indicating their possible role in explaining the duration
and persistence of business cycles. Labor frictions have a similar eﬀect but, interestingly, only
when they do not aﬀect investment per worker.5
The interplay of information frictions in the credit and labor markets is an important new
4The moral hazard and eﬃciency wage hypothesis is at the center of many papers analyzing labor market
dynamics in the general equilibrium tradition, notably, Danthine and Donaldson (1990), Kahn and Mookherjee
(1987), Coimbra (1996), Gomme (1999), among others.
5In an extension of the model [see Section 7 below] we show that if heightened distortions in the labor market
increased investment per worker through a reallocation of labor across two sectors (one of them unaﬀected by
these frictions), then temporary shocks would be less persistent.
4contribution to the literature. Three papers that present an unidirectional connection and relate
most closely to our work are Betts and Bhattacharya (1998), Acemoglu (2000) and Wasmer
and Weil (2001). Betts and Bhattacharya (1998) study how adverse selection problems in the
labor market in the presence of credit market frictions can lead to complex dynamics, cycles and
development traps. However, in their setup, since all capitalists remain unemployed and receive
a constant “home production output”, labor market wages really have no direct eﬀect on the
credit market, except through the supply of funds. In contrast, in this paper, wages are used
as collateral by employed capitalists which determine the terms of credit they receive on bank
loans. Wasmer and Weil (2001) model speciﬁcity in credit relationships, and assume that credit
to potential loan-seekers is rationed due to search frictions. Similarly, search frictions in the labor
market produce equilibrium unemployment. They too ﬁnd that credit frictions exacerbate labor
market frictions and further increase unemployment. In contrast, we focus on credit rationing
and unemployment problems arising out of informational asymmetries. Acemoglu (2000) uses a
simple model in which Europe and the US are identical except for higher credit market frictions
in the former. He considers the response of these two economies to a common shock, the arrival
of a new set of technologies, and shows how the US economy responds to the arrival of new
technologies without an increase in unemployment. In contrast, the technological change can
have a persistent adverse eﬀect on European unemployment because, in the absence of eﬃcient
credit markets, agents who need funds for startups cannot borrow the necessary amount.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the model
environment, preferences and technology. In Section 3, we study the eﬃciency wage contract and
in Section 4, we spell out details of the credit market contract under costly state veriﬁcation.
General equilibrium analysis in Section 5 studies the short- and long-run eﬀects of the two
frictions. Section 6 brieﬂy compares the four models that are nested within our two-frictions
model. Section 7 studies an extension to the model, and we conclude in section 8 with ideas for
future research.
2 Environment
We analyze a production economy inhabited by an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived overlap-
ping generations, plus an initial old generation. At each date, t =1 ,2,3..., a new generation is
born, consisting of a continuum of agents with mass 1. Thus, the measure of total population at
any date t is 2.
5All agents are ex ante identical. They are risk-neutral and care only for their second period
consumption (c2). Speciﬁcally, we assume that the utility function is given by U (c2)=βc2,
gross of any work-related disutilities (see below). Individuals are endowed with unit labor time
in youth and are retired when old. They may either supply it to the labor market for a wage
wt, or, remain unemployed. Some of the workers subsequently obtain an opportunity to become
capitalists and create capital, the details of which we discuss below. Letting St denote an agent’s
saving and Rt+1 the gross return on it, we note that c2,t+1 = Rt+1St and that indirect lifetime
utility is simply βRt+1St, gross of work-related disutilities.6
A worker can either work the entire one unit of time or shirk completely, choosing eﬀort level
e ∈ {0,1}.L e t v>0 and a>0 represent the disutilities from being employed by a ﬁrm and
from actually working. We assume that v is identical for all young agents but that a diﬀers. In
particular, a ∼ z(a) with support [a,∞], a > 0. A worker’s utility from full eﬀort (e =1 )i s
given by βc2 − (v + a), from shirking (e =0 )b yβc2 − v,a n db yβc2 ≥ 0 if unemployed.
The economy produces a perishable good every period which may be consumed or invested.
This good is produced by the old capitalists (ﬁrms) who have access to a constant returns
technology that combines capital, K,w i t he ﬀective labor, (1−ζ)L, to produce output H(K,(1−
ζ)L).H e r eζ is the fraction of employees who exert no eﬀort (shirk) and L is the total number of
employees. To foreshadow, ﬁrms will write eﬃciency wage contracts in equilibrium that optimally
set ζ =0 , that is, in equilibrium, only non-shirkers are employed.
Let kt ≡ Kt/[(1 − ζ)Lt] denote the capital to eﬀective-labor ratio, and h(kt) ≡ H(kt,1),
denote the associated intensive production function where h satisﬁes h(0) = 0, h0 > 0 >h 00,a n d
standard Inada conditions. For much of what we do below, we assume that
h(k)=Ak
α,A > 0,α ∈ (0,1). (1)





and the wage rate by




Employed workers enter a lottery that assigns some of them access to a capital investment
technology. The capital investment technology (project) is an indivisible risky linear stochastic
technology in that q>0 units of the ﬁnal good invested in a project at date t yield zq units of
6The initial old generation is endowed with an aggregate capital stock of K1 > 0.
6new capital at t +1,w h e r ez is an i.i.d. (across capitalists and dates) random variable, which is
realized at t +1 .W e l e t G denote the probability distribution of z, and assume that G has a
diﬀerentiable density function g with ﬁnite support [0, ¯ z], ¯ z<∞. We denote by ˆ z the mean of z.
The aforementioned indivisibility in investment implies that external ﬁnance may be needed
to operate this technology. The source of this external ﬁnance, as will be made clear below, is
savings of workers who did not become capitalists. In an environment with credit rationing, it
is possible that some potential capitalists may remain unfunded.
The amount of capital actually produced by a project is private information to the project
owner. Any other agent can perfectly witness the return on that project only by incurring a
ﬁxed cost of γ>0 units of capital.7 This informational asymmetry embedded in the capital
investment technology is the source of credit market frictions. Finally, we assume that once the
new capital produced by a project between t and t +1h a sb e e nu s e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fﬁnal
goods at t +1 , it depreciates completely.
We summarize our discussion of the environment by providing the reader with the following
time line of events. At birth, an agent ﬁnds out her disutility of eﬀort, a. As we establish below,
ﬁrms (old capitalists) observe a and oﬀer incentive compatible wage-employment contracts that
employ young agents with disutility a<ˆ a. The rest are unemployed and earn zero income. All
employed agents save their entire income and use them in one of two possible ways. Some of
them will receive an opportunity to become a capitalist in which case they will use their saving
as internal ﬁnance on their capital production projects, pending receipt of external ﬁnance. If
they get funding, they produce capital and earn a return from this activity. If not, they, along
with all the employed workers who did not get an opportunity to become a capitalist, save their
young incomes with an intermediary that promises them a market-determined return. As will
be evident below, the possibility of becoming a capitalist in the future aﬀects the decisions of
workers in the present.
3 Labor Market Contracts
The basic formulation of the labor market closely follows Coimbra (1999) and Jullien and Picard
(1998). Firms observe a, but receive an imperfect veriﬁable signal about a worker’s eﬀort. The
signal takes binary values, high or low. Let θ denote the conditional probability that it takes on
a high value even when eﬀort is zero.
7We follow Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1998) in using this standard assumption.
7As Jullien and Picard (1998) show, ﬁrms oﬀer a wage contract {ω1 (a),ω 0 (a)} ∈ <2
+ to each
worker of type a,w h e r eω1 (a) is the wage for a high value of the signal and ω0 (a) t h ew a g ef o ra
low value. Recall Rt+1 denotes the expected return on a unit of funds between t and t+1.F i r m s
want all workers to exert full eﬀort. The wage contract they oﬀer will be incentive compatible
as long as
βRt+1ω1t (a) − v − a>[θω1t (a)+( 1− θ)ω0t (a)]βRt+1 − v
⇔ βRt+1 (1 − θ)[ω1t (a) − ω0t (a)] ≥ a (4)
Since the unemployed receive nothing, it is rational for a type a worker to sign such a wage
contract if
βRt+1ω1t (a) − v − a ≥ 0
⇔ βRt+1ω1t (a) ≥ v + a. (5)
This is the worker’s participation constraint. Note that the worker’s participation constraint (5)
is endogenous since it depends upon endogenously determined prices.
Assume without loss of generality that ω0 (a)=0 . Then all unemployment is involuntary if





which we henceforth maintain. In equilibrium the incentive constraint (4) will bind and
ˆ at = β(1 − θ)ω1tRt+1, (6)
determines the cut-oﬀ disutility level ˆ at, given prices, above which no worker is hired. Since
full eﬀort by any worker produces the same output, each employed worker earns the same wage,
irrespective of a. Equation (6) shows that, ceteris paribus,a ni n c r e a s ei nθ (noisiness of the output
signal) increases unemployment while an increase in wages is associated with higher employment.
Proposition 1 (Jullien and Picard, 1998) An optimal labor contract is a triple {ω0(at),ω1(at),
ˆ at} such that (i) ω0(at)=0for all at > ˆ at, (ii) ω1(at)=ωt [see eq. (3)] for all at ≤ ˆ at,a n d ,
(iii) all workers with disutility cost of working less than ˆ at, determined by eq. (6), are employed
and exert full eﬀort.
8Workers do not self-select into and out of jobs; what they select into is exerting full eﬀort, conditional on
ﬁnding a job. If a is unobservable, then involuntary unemployment is not possible.
8It follows that total employment is
Lt = z(ˆ at)=z(β(1 − θ)ωtRt+1), (7)
and the unemployment rate
ut ≡ 1 − z(ˆ at). (8)








for an aggregate capital stock Kt, and output per young person by
˜ yt ≡ Yt = h(kt)z(ˆ at). (10)
4C r e d i t M a r k e t s
We now turn to the credit market. As mentioned earlier, after labor market outcomes are
realized and compensation received, employed workers are allocated a production opportunity
with probability ϕ ∈ (0,1) as in Khan (2001). This opportunity enables a young employed worker
to become a capitalist and produce capital using the risky, indivisible technology described above.
B yt h el a wo fl a r g en u m b e r s ,aϕ fraction of the employed workers receive this opportunity in any
period.9 Under the terms of the labor contract each worker receives a real income ωt when young.
A measure of workers Lt given by (7) ﬁnd jobs, the rest remain unemployed and receive zero
lifetime utility. Among these employed workers, ϕLt have the potential to become capitalists. In
an environment with credit rationing, some of these (a fraction µ) potential capitalists receive
funding. The rest simply invest their savings in alternative means.
Since employed workers can ultimately become capitalists, the expected return to saving must
take account of that possibility. Let Rc denotes the one-period return to becoming a capitalist,
Rfc denotes the one-period return accruing to a funded capitalist, and Rw denotes the one-period
return to saving as a worker. Then, it must be that
R = ϕR
c +( 1− ϕ)R
w,
9We do not allow unemployed workers to get access to any capital production opportunity. Our assumption
captures, albeit in an extreme manner, the notion that people with a high propensity to shirk as workers cannot
possibly be great capitalists. There is a technical reason for this assumption. Since unemployed workers in the
model earn no income at all, they can provide no internal ﬁnance, unlike the employed who can supply their
w a g e sa si n t e r n a lﬁnance. Were we to allow the unemployed to also become capitalists, we would have created
two kinds of capitalists with two levels of internal ﬁnance, and hence two kinds of loan contracts, an unnecessary









t+1 +( 1− pt)R
w
t+1,
where pt = ϕµt is the probability of becoming a funded capitalist. Equilibrium values of pt,R c
and Rw will be determined below.
Following Williamson (1986) we assume that all lending is intermediated. In other words,
workers who do not receive the capital production opportunity simply deposit their savings with
an intermediary who pools these deposits and makes loans on their behalf. In addition, following
Diamond (1984), intermediaries perform the role of delegated monitors, verifying project returns
as per the terms of loan contracts. We assume that any lender may establish an intermediary.
In equilibrium, with unrestricted entry into the market for intermediation services, all interme-
diaries must oﬀer a common competitively determined deposit return, rt+1, must hold perfectly
diversiﬁed loan and deposit portfolios, and must earn zero proﬁt s .I nt h i sc o n t e x t ,i ti si m p o r -
tant to note that project returns are i.i.d. across a continuum of capitalists and hence there is no
aggregate randomness. Consequently, an intermediary with a perfectly diversiﬁed loan portfolio
earns a non-stochastic return on its assets and need not be monitored by its depositors.
4.1 Loan Contracts
The capital investment technology (project) is an indivisible technology that can only be operated
at the scale q.10 We assume that all capitalists need some amount of external ﬁnancing to operate
their individual projects. Equivalently, we assume that
Assumption 2
q>ω t
holds at all dates. All capitalists therefore need external ﬁnancing of the amount
bt = q − ωt > 0.
Potential borrowers, wishing to obtain external funding, announce loan contracts that may be
accepted or rejected by lenders (banks). Borrowers whose contracts are accepted receive external
funding of the amount bt after which they operate their projects.
10Boyd and Smith (1998) discuss how the determination of the equilibrium capital stock is unaﬀected by
abandoning the assumption that project scale is ﬁxed at q.
10Under this costly state veriﬁcation setup and deterministic monitoring, Gale and Hellwig
(1985) and Williamson (1986) show that optimal loan contracts take a simple form. In particular,
the state space [0, ¯ z] is divided into two subsets At and Bt. For all realizations of z ∈ At,
intermediaries verify project returns for sure. But if z ∈ Bt ≡ [0, ¯ z] − At,n ov e r i ﬁcation occurs.
Let Rt(z) denote the promised real payment per unit borrowed for all z ∈ At.S i n c en ov e r i ﬁcation
occurs on Bt, incentive compatible payments would have to be independent of realizations of z.
Let xt denote this uncontingent payment (per unit borrowed) for all z ∈ Bt.
Intermediaries take the return to be paid on deposits between t and t+1, rt+1,a sg i v e na n d
act as if there is a perfectly elastic demand for deposits at this rate. Hence, they agree to the
terms of such a loan contract only if the expected return on lending is at least as great as rt+1.













g(z)dz is the real expected monitoring cost. In addition, all contracts must be
incentive compatible, that is,
Rt(z) ≤ xt for z ∈ At (12)















Potential capitalists simply maximize their own expected utility by choosing the contractual
obligations optimally subject to the constraints (11)-(14). The solution to this problem is a
standard debt contract. When the capitalist realizes a return z ∈ Bt,h ep a y sxt (principal plus
interest) to the lender. When z ∈ At, he defaults; in this case, the intermediary monitors the
project and retains the entire proceeds (rental income from whatever capital is produced) net of
monitoring costs.11






z for z ∈ At,
11Such monitoring or auditing costs can be fairly substantial even in developed countries. For example, Del
Boca and Lusardi (1998) quote a Bank of Italy estimate that it took 5.5 years on average for an Italian bank to
repossess the collateral.

















Using Proposition 2, it is also easy to show the following:
























where the function Φ gives the expected return to the lender as a function of the gross loan rate,
xt, the amount borrowed, bt,a n dt h ef u t u r er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fc a p i t a l ,ρt+1. Following Williamson





















g(0) − G(0) > 0.
Assumption 3 ensures the concavity of Φ,t h a ti s ,Φ11 < 0. In addition, if assumption 4 holds, Φ
is inverse U- shaped. Hence there will be a unique xt depending upon bt/ρt+1 which maximizes





















































where δ>0 is a constant satisfying
1 − (γ/q)g(δ) − G(δ) ≡ 0.
The object δ has a straightforward implication: the set At is now deﬁned by z ∈ [0,δ).T h a ti s ,
when all potential borrowers are oﬀering the interest rate that maximizes a prospective lender’s
expected rate of return, δ is the critical project return for which a borrower’s project income
exactly covers loan principal plus interest.
124.2 Credit Rationing
In the environment speciﬁed above, it is quite possible to have an unsatisﬁed demand for credit
as originally noted by Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987a). If all capitalists
want to run their projects at any date t then the total demand for credit is just ϕ(q − ωt)Lt.
Aggregate supply of funds comes from the saving of all employed workers, (1 − ϕ)ωtLt.T h e na
necessary condition for credit rationing for all t is
(1 − ϕ)ωtLt <ϕ(q − ωt)Lt ⇔ ϕq > ωt. (17)
If (17) is satisﬁed, there will be credit rationing in equilibrium and





must hold. This implies that under credit rationing, all potential borrowers are oﬀering the
interest rate that maximizes a prospective lender’s expected rate of return. No borrower can
therefore obtain credit by changing the interest rate and other loan terms without reducing the
expected return for all lenders. In this setting, some borrowers must remain unsatisﬁed, or in
other words, credit rationing will obtain in equilibrium. Below, we focus on economies where
rationing occurs at all dates.
The following lemma summarizes information about the payoﬀs to lenders and all funded
borrowers.


























and (b) the expected utility of a funded borrower under credit rationing is given by
ρt+1qφ− rt+1bt,
where






13The proof of this lemma follows directly from the arguments in Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998).
It must also be the case that any potential capitalist actually prefers borrowing and operating
his project to simply depositing his income with the intermediary. Boyd and Smith (1998) prove
that a suﬃcient condition for all capitalists to operate their projects using external ﬁnance is
Assumption 5
(1 − α)φq ≥ ψ.
5 General Equilibrium
We turn to an analysis of the general equilibrium. Equilibrium in the credit market under
rationing implies that only a fraction µt < 1 of capitalists get external funding at each date
t. Each funded borrower borrows an amount bt. Therefore, the total volume of loans granted
is µtϕLtbt. The total supply of savings is the sum of the wage incomes of employed workers
who did not receive a production opportunity. These are the natural lenders of our economy.
Additionally, unfunded capitalists also deposit their funds with an intermediary and, in eﬀect,
become lenders. The total supply of loanable funds is then given by
[(1 − ϕ)+ϕ(1 − µt)]Ltωt. (19)
Equality between sources and uses requires that
ϕµtbtLt =( 1− ϕ)ωtLt + ϕ(1 − µt)ωtLt (20)





which is less than one (as is evident from (17) above).
As discussed earlier, there is no aggregate randomness in this economy. Consequently, the
capital stock at date t +1will be the amount of capital produced, (µtϕLt)ˆ zq, less the amount
spent on monitoring bankrupt projects. Recall that monitoring occurs for sure when realiza-





µtϕLt ≡ γG(δ)µtϕLt. Hence, the aggregate capital stock at t +1is
Kt+1 = µtϕφqLt, (22)
14where the constant φ was deﬁned in Lemma 1 above. Using (21) and noting that Lt = z(ˆ at),
we can eliminate µt to obtain
Kt+1 = φωtz(ˆ at). (23)











ad i ﬀerence equation in (kt,ˆ at).
The second piece describing general equilibrium comes from the labor market, speciﬁcally
the worker’s incentive constraint (6). First we use equilibrium prices and quantities to simplify
this expression. Evidently pt = ϕµt and Rw
t+1 = rt+1 as deﬁn e di nL e m m a1 .B yL e m m a1 ( b ) ,
an entrepreneur’s expected return from investing ωt of his own funds into the capital production






/ωt is the expected return to
being a funded capitalist. Substituting these expressions into (6) and simplifying gives us
ˆ at = β(1 − θ)ωt[ptR
fc
t+1 +( 1− pt)R
w
t+1]
= βφ(1 − θ)ω(kt)ρ(kt+1), (25)
where the expected gross return on savings, Rt+1,e q u a l sφρt+1, the marginal product of capital
net of monitoring costs incurred per unit invested.
5.1 Stationary and Non-Stationary Equilibria
Using (24) and (25), dynamic equilibria may be expressed as a second-order diﬀerence equation





when credit is rationed at all dates. Given an initial value for K1, equation (26) describes the
subsequent evolution of any potentially valid equilibrium sequence {kt}∞
t=2. From such a sequence,




equilibria will be time-invariant solutions to
k = φω(k). (27)
To examine stationary and non-stationary equilibria more closely it will be more convenient to





ˆ at = βφ(1 − θ)ω(kt)ρ(kt+1). (29)
15Using (3), we can then write


















where η ≡ [αβφ(1 − θ)(1 − α)A2]





t z(ˆ at), (33)












Below, we establish the local stability properties of the unique non-trivial steady state.
Proposition 3 The non-trivial steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle.
Proposition 3 (see Appendix A for a proof) suggests that the unique equilibrium path of
{kt,a t} asymptotically converges to the stationary equilibrium (k∗,ˆ a∗). Unlike in the standard
Diamond (1965) model, where all young agents work in youth, here the initial capital stock
per worker (k1) is not given. What is given is the initial aggregate capital stock, K1.D e ﬁne
k1 ≡ K1/z(ˆ a1). With perfect foresight, the initial ˆ a1 is determined such that the conﬁguration
(k1,ˆ a1) places the economy on the stable manifold approaching the stationary equilibrium (k∗,ˆ a∗).
5.2 Comparative Statics
We undertake a bunch of comparative statics exercises to illustrate the eﬀects of the two frictions,
parameterized by γ and θ [the agency cost parameter and the informativeness of the eﬀort signal]
on steady-state capital per worker, output and unemployment. The starting point is the steady-
state capital-labor ratio derived for a Cobb-Douglas technology deﬁned in (1) using (27)
k
∗ =[ ( 1− α)φA]
1













16and the steady-state employment level L∗ = z(ˆ a∗) determined, from (33), by
ˆ a







Steady-state output per worker, y∗ = A(k∗)α, depends upon k∗, while output per capita (more
accurately, per young person), ˜ y∗ = A(k∗)αz(ˆ a∗), also depends on steady-state employment.
Consider ﬁrst γ, our proxy for agency costs or the costs of acquiring private information. A
higher γ has two eﬀects. It implies larger deadweight losses from monitoring. At the same time,
higher monitoring costs induce banks to monitor less often, i.e., over a smaller set of bankruptcy
states (lower δ). For unit monitoring costs γG(δ)/q to be increasing in γ, following Azariadis












As long as this is satisﬁed, the steady-state capital per worker decreases with higher monitoring
costs, ∂k∗/∂γ < 0.12 Output per worker is hence lower the higher are agency costs in the credit
market. From (21), it is also apparent that credit is more intensely rationed — fewer capitalists
are funded because the aggregate cost of monitoring them is greater.
On the employment side, a decline in k∗ lowers the steady-state wage rate. Ceteris paribus,
al o w e r i n go ft h ee ﬃciency wage can be sustained only if the unemployment rate is kept high
enough to ‘discipline’ workers and dissuade shirking. Consequently, u∗ rises. With the decline
in employment, output per capita falls because each worker is now less productive and secondly,
because there are fewer workers earning an income.
Turn next to the eﬀect of an increase in θ.R e c a l l t h a t θ is the conditional probability of
receiving a signal that a worker has exerted high eﬀort when he has not. A higher θ makes it
harder for ﬁrms to judge their workers’ actions and this increases the severity of the labor market
friction. Somewhat surprisingly, as (34) reveals, labor frictions have no eﬀect on the long-run
capital per worker k∗, and therefore, leave steady-state credit rationing µ∗ unaﬀected. At the
same time, a higher θ leads to lower long-run employment as is evident from (35).
It is instructive to lay out the adjustment process following a change in θ.F r o m e q .( 2 9 ) ,
g i v e na na g g r e g a t ec a p i t a ls t o c k ,a ni n c r e a s ei nθ increases unemployment, thereby increasing
capital per worker. The resulting increase in wages raises the incentive of workers to supply
12See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Azariadis and Chakraborty (1999) for two examples of g(.) that satisfy
this assumption.
17high eﬀort. This induces ﬁrms to hire more workers and the initial decline in unemployment is
partially oﬀset. The net result of lower employment is to reduce the aggregate ﬂow of savings and
loanable funds into the capital market, ωtLt. Investment declines as does the aggregate capital
stock which via the wage rate elicits more unemployment. Since the size of the workforce (=
savers) is constant in steady-state, the long-run eﬀect is to leave the capital-labor ratio unaﬀected
with employment and the aggregate capital stock falling proportionately, by the full increase in
θ. Of course this means output per worker y∗ remains unchanged. But since the unemployed do
not consume anything in our model, a better yardstick of welfare is output per capita, e y∗,w h i c h
clearly declines as labor frictions worsen.
To summarize, while γ has long-run eﬀects on capital and output per worker and on employ-
ment, θ aﬀects only employment and the aggregate capital stock in the long-run. But as our
preceding discussion indicates, labor frictions have short-run eﬀects as the economy adjusts to
its new steady-state.
As Appendix A below shows, the Jacobian of the linearized dynamic system depends on both
γ and θ via ˆ a∗.T h er e l a t i v ee ﬀe c to ft h es e v e r i t yo ft h e s et w of r i c t i o n sa l o n gt h es a d d l ep a t hi so f
interest here. Consider small deviations from the steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗).T h eb e h a v i o ro f(kt,ˆ at)
for such small departures will be governed by the stable eigenvalue of the Jacobian Q for the
linearized dynamic system. In other words, if λ1 denotes this eigenvalue, we have
˜ kt = λ
t
1˜ k0 and ˜ at = λ
t
1˜ a0,
where ˜ zt ≡ (zt − z∗)/z∗ denotes deviation from steady-state. The smaller is λ1, the faster is
convergence since the more rapidly does zt approach z∗. As we prove near the end of Appendix
A, more severe credit and labor market frictions, that is, increases in γ and θ, are both associated
with higher values of λ1. Hence, convergence to steady-state is slower the greater are frictions in
the two markets.
These results have interesting implications for high- and low-frequency movements. A number
of researchers, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Ortigueira and Santos (1997) for example,
have deliberated on the speed of convergence in the context of development. Whether or not this
speed is high determines the relative emphasis we should place on the dynamics of convergence
versus the properties of the steady-state in analyzing the sources of long-run growth. The slower
speed of convergence in our model is one possible explanation as to why so many countries,
particularly those in Africa, have lagged behind even as a few have made enormous strides in
the past half-century.
18Although our analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations model, it is not inconceivable
that the underlying economic mechanisms are generalizable to an RBC-type economy (similar
to how Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) adapt Bernanke and Gertler (1989) in an inﬁnite horizon
model). To the extent that this can be done, frictions have interesting implications for business
cycle movements too: labor market frictions in conjunction with credit frictions have the ability
to amplify temporary shocks and exacerbate recessions. RBC models have often been critiqued
for requiring relative large and persistent exogenous shocks to generate business cycle behavior.
Our economy with frictions would require these shocks to be of smaller magnitude (since frictions
amplify them) and less persistent (since frictions slow down convergence speed) to match the
same business cycle facts. Consider, for example, a one-time (exogenous) adverse shock to the
Solow-residual A at time t. This would lower the wage rate ωt, and reduce the ﬂow of loanable
funds. At the same time, it lowers borrower net worth, leading to a greater fraction of capitalists
being credit-constrained. The credit friction margin, working through borrowing constraints,
ampliﬁes the temporary shock on its own (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). But the presence of
labor frictions worsens the impact: a lower wage rate leads to greater unemployment, lesser ﬂow
of savings and elicits an even steeper decline in investment.
Furthermore, the rate at which the economy bounces back from such a temporary adverse
shock depends upon the severity of these frictions. The two frictions work together to prolong
the eﬀects of a recession the more distorted credit and labor markets are. How strong these
ampliﬁcation and persistence eﬀects are, of course, requires a full-ﬂedged quantitative analysis.
But at the least, our model indicates the potential role frictions may play in explaining properties
of business cycles across countries, or even within a country at diﬀerent points in time.
6 The Underlying Nested Models
The model described thus far in fact nests three diﬀerent models, one where only the labor
market friction is active (as in, say, Jullien and Picard, 1998), one where only the credit market
friction is active (as in, Boyd and Smith, 1998, for example), and of course, the full-information
frictionless Diamond (1965) model. We brieﬂy sketch each of the nested models with the purpose
of uncovering the exact inﬂuence of each friction on the models’ deeper features.
To facilitate comparisons, we set ˆ z =1and restrict ourselves to φ ∈ [0,1].W h e n γ =0
we have φ =1 , the case where all information is eﬀectively public and credit markets work
frictionless. Similarly, setting θ =0gives us a frictionless labor market since ﬁrms can perfectly
19deduce their employees’ work eﬀorts. In order that our model behaves exactly like the full-














which guarantees that all borrowers are funded and all workers employed when credit and labor
markets are free of frictions.13
6.1 Nested models
Model with Only Labor Friction
In most respects this is the classic Diamond model except that workers are of heterogenous
types and ﬁrms issue eﬃciency wage contracts that keep the shirkers away at the cost of some






The equilibrium consists of sequences of {kt,ˆ at} that satisfy equation (36) above and (37) below
ˆ at = β(1 − θ)ω(kt)f
0(kt+1). (37)
The positive stationary equilibrium can be show to be unique and saddle-path stable.
Model with Only Credit Friction
As in the standard Diamond model, there will be full employment, Lt =1for all t,i nt h i s
case. The active CSV friction aﬀects returns on loans and deposits as deﬁn e di nL e m m a1 :
Rt+1 = ψf0(kt+1)/{q −ω(kt)} and also results in credit rationing. Under our assumption of zero
ﬁrst period consumption, using (23), it follows that kt+1 = φω(kt). Standard arguments establish
the existence of a unique asymptotically stable steady state (see Boyd and Smith, 1998).
Full-information Diamond model
13The frictionless (γ = θ =0 )version of our model does not reduce to the textbook Diamond model because
we have assumed ﬁxed project size (q) and worker disutility from exerting eﬀort (a). Even without frictions, it
may still be the case that workers with very high a do not ﬁnd exerting eﬀort to be in their best interest. In
s u c has e t t i n g ,w a g e sh a v et ob es u ﬃciently high to align these workers’ incentives with the ﬁrms’, or else these
workers would remain unemployed. Similarly, wages have to be high enough for aggregate savings to fund all
entrepreneurs. A high A is suﬃcient to get high wages.
20The law-of-motion for capital per worker will be kt+1 = ω(kt) here, which possesses a unique
and asymptotically stable positive steady-state.
It is clear that adding the two frictions does not fundamentally alter the stability properties
of the steady-states, nor does it contribute to multiple equilibria of the kind that Betts and
Bhattacharya (1998) and Acemoglu (2001) note.
6.2 Model comparisons
To examine how each type of friction impacts the steady-states, deﬁne k∗
D to be the steady state
capital-labor ratio in the full-information Diamond model, k∗
L to be the same in the model with
the labor market friction, k∗
C for the model with just the credit market friction, and k∗
LC,t h e
stationary capital-labor ratio for the model with both frictions.
Lemma 2 Under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology,
k∗
D =[ A(1 − α)]
1
1−α , k∗




C =[ φA(1 − α)]
1
1−α , k∗
LC =[ φA(1 − α)]
1
1−α ,
where, φ is deﬁned in Lemma 1. The corresponding employment rate in the presence of labor
frictions is given by equation (35).
Recalling equation (21), the fraction borrowers who are funded in steady-state is µ∗ =
ω(k∗)/(ϕq) as long as γ>0 (all borrowers are funded for γ =0 ). Since only employed workers
obtain production opportunities in our model, we may also want to think about economy-wide
access to credit, that is, fraction of young agents who are able to obtain loans, ˜ µ∗ = ϕµ∗z(a(k∗)).
Comparing steady-states across these four nested economies we note that:




D: the steady-state capital per worker is lowest for






D =1 : the extent of credit rationing is identical in the economy with
both frictions and in the economy with only credit market frictions. However, the fraction of the
population with access to credit is higher in the former: ˜ µ∗
LC < ˜ µ∗
C.
c) ˆ a∗ < ˆ a∗: long-run unemployment is higher in the economy with both frictions than in the
economy with only the labor market friction.
21Proposition 4 (a) and (b) follow directly from our earlier discussions. For (c), note that credit
frictions aﬀect worker’s incentives through the wage rate. In the presence of these frictions, capital
accumulation is lower and so is the wage that workers are oﬀered in equilibrium. The lower wage
increases worker incentives to shirk; employers respond by cutting back on employment.
Proposition 4 carries an important implication. It suggests that instead of cancelling out
each other’s eﬀe c t s ,f r i c t i o n sr e i n f o r c ee a c ho t h e rt ow e i g hd o w no nr e a la c t i v i t ya l o n gt h eg r o w t h
path. In particular, the presence of the credit market friction worsens the severity of the labor
market friction and raises long-run unemployment. Several caveats notwithstanding, our analysis
suggests that employment policies designed to reduce unemployment may perform better if other
policies concurrently lower the severity of the credit market friction. There is evidence to suggest
that both credit and labor market frictions are more acute in Europe relative to the US. The
model indicates that institutional imperfections in both markets may be vital for explaining
Europe’s deeper unemployment problems.14
7E x t e n s i o n s
As we noted in section 5, a surprising feature of our setup is that labor market frictions do
not aﬀect long-run real activity per worker. As will be evident below, this result hinges on a
previously made assumption that precludes the unemployment rate from aﬀecting saving and
investment per worker. In this section, we discuss a simple modiﬁcation to our earlier setup in
which this assumption does not hold.
Suppose we allow unemployed workers to receive an alternate means of income. In particular,
suppose we posit that the unemployed can ultimately engage in household production, converting
their youthful labor time into τ units of the consumption good.15 We assume τ<ω (k) for
all “relevant” values of k. Just as before, these workers do not receive any other production
opportunity, but can now deposit their savings with the same intermediary that the employed
workers access. Since savings of the unemployed ﬂows into the credit market, eﬀective savings
per worker will now depend on labor market frictions via the size of the unemployed pool.16
14Wasmer and Weil (2002) also argue that recent evidence suggests European unemployment to be more than
simply a labor market phenomenon. They point out that Europe’s unemployment problems have persisted and
economic activity remained sluggish even after European labor markets eliminated many of the rigidities widely
blamed for its problems.
15The income τ may be interpreted as home production, as in the real business cycle literature. Alternatively,
we can view it as legal informal sector activity, as in the development economics literature.
16As an alternative, consider a model where people potentially work in both periods of life (wage contracts are
still one period long). If agents can become unemployed when old, then their saving behavior would depend upon
22Without presenting a full reworking of the model, we highlight some of the basic changes to the
analysis. The speciﬁcs of the loan contracts remain as in section 4, but credit market outcomes
are aﬀected. Total demand for credit, when all capitalists want to operate their projects, is
ϕ(q − ωt)Lt. Aggregate supply of funds now comes from the savings of employed workers who
did not receive a production opportunity, (1 − ϕ)ωtLt, and of the unemployed, τ(1 − Lt).T h e n
a necessary condition for credit rationing to hold for all t is
(1 − ϕ)ωtLt + τ(1 − Lt) <ϕ(q − ωt)Lt ⇔ ϕq > ωt + ltτ,
where l ≡ (1 − L)/L is the fraction of workforce engaged in household production. Equating






Compared to (21), ceteris paribus, credit rationing will now be less pervasive since the unem-
ployed have positive savings invested in the capital market. What is key, however, is that labor
frictions now directly aﬀect credit rationing through lt.
Turning to the labor market, we reconsider a worker’s incentive compatibility constraint. We
normalize the wage that ﬁrms pay to shirking workers as ω0t =0and to non-shirkers as ω1t = ωt,
as before. Workers exert full eﬀort iﬀ
βRt+1 (1 − θ)ωt (a) ≥ a, (38)
a condition similar to (4). Since unemployed workers earn τ from household production, it is
rational for a type a worker to sign such a contract if
βRt+1ωt (a) − v − a ≥ βR
w
t+1τ.
All unemployment is involuntary if the ﬁrst constraint implies the second and the latter is not
binding, that is, as long as
a ≥ (1 − θ)
£










that possibility. It is possible to have labor market frictions aﬀect steady-state real activity in this environment.
Of course, this reformulation would require some risk aversion on the part of agents; however, this requirement
would preclude the possibility of deriving a standard debt contract in the credit market.
23anticipating that starting from a initial k1 <k ∗, return to savings will monotonically decline
as the economy approaches its steady-state. We assume parameter values, including the initial
capital stock k1, which satisfy this condition.17
Equilibrium employment is determined by (38) holding as an equality. Again, since expected
utility of a funded borrower under credit rationing is ρt+1qφ − rt+1bt, his expected return on
savings is R
fc
t+1 =[ ρt+1qφ− rt+1bt]/ωt. Given the probability of becoming a capitalist pt = ϕµt,
expected return on savings is given by
Rt+1 =[ ptR
fc
t+1 +( 1− pt)R
w
t+1]ωt






which now depends on the allocation of labor between the formal and household activities (lt)
a n do nr e t u r n st oh o u s e h o l dp r o d u c t i o nr e l a t i v et of o r m a ls e c t o re a r n i n g s( τ/ωt). Equilibrium
employment is determined by ˆ at according to
ˆ at = β(1 − θ)[φρt+1ωt + ltτ(φρt+1 − rt+1)]













In the capital market, aggregate ﬂow of loanable funds now comprises of the savings of the






1 − z(ˆ at)
z(ˆ at+1)
. (40)
Equations (39) and (40) comprise the new dynamical system whose steady states satisfy
k = φω (k)+φτ
·

















This dynamical system is a lot more complicated than the one in (24) and (25). It is harder
to establish stability and comparative statics results analytically in this case. Per force we opt
for numerical simulations. We report results for one parameterization, but qualitatively similar
results were obtained for other sets of parameter values. We choose h(k)=6 k0.33,φ=0 .9, τ =1 ,
ψ =2 ,ϕ=0 .75,θ=0 .2,q=2 0 , and f ∼ uniform on [0.2,3.2]. Directly assuming a value for φ
17Alternatively, we can set v =0and automatically satisfy the involuntary unemployment condition for all
a ≥ 0.W ec o u l dn o th a v ed o n es oi ns e c t i o n2 ,b e c a u s ev>0 is required to ensure that all unemployed workers
are involuntarily unemployed.
24and ψ is convenient especially since it does not require us to specify a distribution function g;i t
also allows a more direct interpretation of the credit market distortion.
For these parameter values, the non-trivial steady state is unique, as in the baseline model
with no household production. In particular, (k∗,ˆ a∗)=( 6 .9,3.0), with an associated unemploy-
ment rate of about 6.9%,ω (k∗)/τ ' 7.6, and roughly half of the set of potential capitalists are
funded.18 To examine stability, we log-linearized equations (39) and (40) around this steady-state.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian were 7.55 and 0.45 indicating that (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle-point.
We are interested in how the steady-state adjusts (and how fast it adjusts) to changes in the
severity of the two frictions. Again we rely on numerical simulations and present comparative
statics results in Figures 1-3 below. In Figure 1, raising φ, that is improving credit market
eﬃciency, raises k∗, reduces unemployment and increases the availability of ﬁnance to capitalists.
These eﬀects are intuitive and similar to those obtained analytically in section 5 above.
However, unlike section 5, labor frictions now have long-run eﬀects. As Figure 2 illustrates,
raising θ (worsening labor market conditions) increases unemployment, and interestingly, raises
k∗ as well as the fraction of capitalists who receive funding. What is at work here are the
disparate eﬀects of labor frictions on the demand and supply of loanable funds. When θ goes
up, fewer workers are employed, receive production opportunities, and subsequently, apply to
banks for loans. At the same time, a decline in employment reduces the ﬂow of savings from the
formal sector. The decline in the pool of applicants and formal sector savings are proportional,
for a given capital-labor ratio. What mitigates the situation, a channel absent before, is the
additional ﬂow of savings from a larger pool of unemployed households. This ﬂow increases the
overall supply of credit relative to demand. Not surprisingly, a greater proportion of the potential
capitalists now get funded, increasing the availability of capital per worker.19
Although this means output per worker y∗ is higher when labor markets are more distorted,
output per capita need not be. Speciﬁcally, per capita income derives from the formal sector as
well from household production, ˜ y∗ = y∗z(ˆ a∗)+τ[1−z(ˆ a∗)]. More severe labor market frictions
tilt economic activity in favor of lower paying household (informal) activities. Under plausible
assumptions regarding the low-productivity of such activities, income per capita would surely
decline.
Next we examine how income from household production aﬀects steady-states. As illustrated
18We checked to ensure that all assumptions of the model are satisﬁed at these values.
19A similar eﬀect would be present in the alternative framework proposed in footnote 16. When labor frictions
worsen and steady-state unemployment rises, each risk-averse worker would save more, leading to a higher steady-
state capital per worker. Of course the nature of this relationship would also depend on the availability of
unemployment insurance and whether jobless young agents can borrow against an uncertain future income.
25in Figure 3, an increase in τ reduces unemployment and raises the steady-state capital per worker
as well as the fraction of capitalists receiving funding. Higher τ makes home production more
attractive and reduces the cutoﬀ ˆ a for ﬁrms. Hence, fewer are unemployed, and the supply
of loanable funds goes up. This reduces the severity of credit rationing, and increases capital
production.20
Finally, we turn to the dynamic eﬀects of credit and labor market frictions. As in the baseline
model these frictions aﬀect the speed with which the economy adjusts along the saddle-path to
its steady-state. Figure 4 reports simulation results of the eﬀect of φ and θ on the smaller (non-
explosive) eigenvalue which drives the convergence dynamics. Since the eigenvalue comes from
the linearized dynamic system, these eﬀects are to be understood as being relevant for small
departures from the steady-state.
With an increase in φ (lessening severity of credit frictions), the stable eigenvalue falls in
absolute value. Not only is the steady-state now higher, the speed of convergence is faster
too. All else being equal, two economies with diﬀe r e n tc r e d i tm a r k e td i s t o r t i o n sw o u l dr e s p o n d
diﬀerently to exogenous one-time shocks — the more distorted one will take longer to bounce
back.
Higher values of θ, in contrast to what we obtained earlier, are now associated with smaller
eigenvalues: an economy with more distorted labor markets actually adjusts to its steady-state
faster. Recall that changes in θ lead to proportional changes in the demand for credit and the
supply of formal sector savings. With more distorted labor markets, a greater fraction of the
population is involved in household production. On a per worker basis, their supply of savings
to the credit market is higher. Consequently, there is more investment per worker, and the
associated rate of capital accumulation is more rapid, leading to faster convergence.
Finally Figure 5 illustrates how increases in τ reduce the stable eigenvalue, speeding up the
convergence process. The mechanism here is similar to that of an increase in θ in that higher
savings from household production allows for larger investment than would be possible, speeding
up capital accumulation and leading to faster convergence to the steady-state.
20It is interesting to note that the traditional development economics literature has portrayed the informal
sector as a drag on development and actively discouraged its presence and growth. In contrast, our analysis
(much like de Soto (2000)) ﬁnds redeeming aspects to actively encouraging it. Note however that we treat τ as
strictly exogenous, i.e., unconnected with the state of the economy.
268 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied credit and labor market frictions in a two-period overlapping
generations model. We embedded a costly state veriﬁcation problem in the credit market and
in the labor market an agency problem where worker eﬀort is imperfectly observed. Compared
to the no-frictions overlapping generations model, these frictions give rise to equilibrium credit
rationing and involuntary unemployment. We examined how the two frictions interact and aﬀect
stationary and non-stationary equilibria.
The economy possesses a unique asymptotically stable positive steady-state to which equi-
librium sequences of the capital-labor ratio and employment monotonically converge. The speed
of convergence and the steady-state itself are aﬀected by market imperfections. Higher credit
frictions lead to greater deadweight losses and more pervasive credit rationing, discouraging cap-
ital accumulation and worsening unemployment problems. Distortions in the labor market, on
the other hand, increase unemployment but aﬀect steady-state capital and output per worker
only when the unemployed have alternative sources of income. Comparative dynamics exercises
suggest that credit frictions prolong convergence to the stationary equilibrium, while the eﬀect of
labor frictions depend upon whether or not unemployment aﬀects the ﬂow of savings per worker.
The simplicity of our model with strong microfoundations of credit and labor market frictions
and its attractive dynamic properties make it particularly suitable for quantitative studies. One
avenue we would like to explore is how well the two frictions explain cross-country unemployment
problems, especially between Europe and the US. Another research question is the importance
of information frictions in explaining business cycle movements (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1994,
Arnold, 2002). Obviously our overlapping generations framework would have to be abandoned
in favor of the inﬁnite-horizon model. As Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) have demonstrated, the
credit friction margin is easily extended to such an environment. Similarly Gomme (1999) oﬀers
aw a yt oi n c o r p o r a t et h ee ﬃciency wage model into an inﬁnite-horizon economy. It is conceivable
that these settings can be proﬁtably married to study the joint inﬂuence of the two frictions on
variables at business cycle frequencies. This would be an interesting issue for future research.
27Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3
To investigate stability of the steady-states, we log-linearize the system described by equations
(32) and (33) using the approximation (zt − z∗)/z∗ =( zt/z∗) − 1 ' ln(zt/z∗) ≡ ˜ zt.
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Similarly, linearizing (33) we get
f(ˆ a











































































Equations (41) and (42) can be written in matrix notation as
xt+1 = Qxt,
where xt =( kt at)0 and the elements of the Jacobian Q are
q11 = α

















Eigenvalues of Q satisfy the characteristic equation
p(λ) ≡ λ
2 − Tλ+ D =0 ,
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indicating that the two roots (λ1,λ 2) fall on the same side of 0.M o r e o v e r ,

















which implies that (λ1,λ 2) fall on either sides of 1. Hence, we have λ1 > 1 and 0 <λ 2 < 1 so
that the steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle-point.
Now deﬁne m(ˆ a∗) ≡ 1+z/(ˆ a∗f) so that T = m/(1 − α) and D = αm/(1 − α). The smaller







Straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that ∂λ1/∂m < 0. We are interested in ∂λ1/∂γ and ∂λ1/∂θ.
This depends upon whether ∂m/∂γ and ∂m/∂θ R 0. For a uniform distribution a ∼ U[a,a],
z/(ˆ a∗f)=1− a/ˆ a∗ is increasing in ˆ a∗. Hence, anything that decreases ˆ a∗ would decrease m,
in turn increasing λ1. From section 5.2, we know that ∂ˆ a∗/∂γ < 0 and ∂ˆ a∗/∂θ < 0.T h e r e f o r e ,
higher credit and labor market frictions both decrease the speed of convergence via λ1.¥
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32Figure 1: Effect of credit friction on steady-states























µ∗Figure 2: Effect of labor friction on steady-states






















µ∗Figure 3: Effect of household production on steady-states
























µ∗Figure 4: Effect of frictions on convergence dynamics

















stable eigenvalueFigure 5: Effect of household production on convergence dynamics
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